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FACTS 
Respondents' ten page statement of facts indicates the extent to which the 
parties differ in their view of the transactions and underscores genuine issues of material 
fact remaining in dispute. In paragraph 4, Respondents state "Gate City suggested a 
scheme" involving individual borrowers. In truth, Gate City merely informed Vaughn Cook 
that it could not lend money to a corporation for permanent home financing and that the 
only financing money available was to Fannie Mae qualified individual borrowers. 
(Deposition of Stan Jenkins, p. 22, Appendix 6 Respondents1 Brief.) 
In that same paragraph at page 3, Respondents assert there was a "prear-
rangement" among Gate City, Kilburn and Cook and the individual borrowers for 
assumption of the loans. Gate City denies any prearrangement or preapproval of 
assumption. Gate City's loan officer, Stan Jenkins, clearly explained that if assumption 
was desired, the assuming party would simply submit applications subject to approval by 
Gate City. (Deposition of Stan Jenkins, p. 26.) 
At page 10, paragraph 17, Respondents claim "each defendant continued to believe 
and understand that he had been released from any and all obligations under the loan 
documents". Gate City disputes whether Respondents held such a belief and whether such 
a belief is reasonable, given the fact that the assumption documents were never executed 
by Kilburn as Respondents anticipated (Record at 1009-1020 Appendix E Appellant's 
Brief). This is especially true regarding two of the Borrowers who were attorneys and 
who understood the requirements for release. Gate City asserts that such a subjective 
belief is not a "fact" which could support summary judgment, but rather a "fact" which 
is in dispute. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Neither of the requirements necessary to find that Respondents had been released 
from their obligations under the promissory notes have been met. The ambiguous language 
of the assumption agreements relied by Respondents does not meet the requirements of 
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either a waiver or an assumption. Certainly, the documents cannot be construed to meet 
both requirements. The language of the documents contain both patent and latent 
ambiguities which preclude the court from interpreting them as a matter of law. Even 
if the documents could be construed to be unambiguous, the intent of the parties, as 
manifest by their actions and the other relevant documents executed contemporaneously 
with the indemnity agreements raise issues of material fact which preclude summary 
judgment. Therefore, the trial court's award of summary judgment must be reversed. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE BORROWERS HAD BEEN RELEASED. 
A. The Requirements Of Release Have Not Been Met. 
Respondents (hereinafter"Borrowers") argue that the indemnity agreements satisfy 
all of the requirements necessary to release them from their obligation to repay their 
promissory notes. One need only review the requirements that must be satisfied to effect 
a release to see that this argument must fail. In order for the Borrowers to be released 
from their obligations under the promissory notes secured by the trust deeds which they 
signed, the terms and conditions of paragraph 17 of such trust deeds (which terms are the 
same as paragraph 10 of the promissory notes) must be fully complied with. That section 
provides: 
17. Transfer of the property; Assumption. If all or 
any part of the property or an interest therein is sold or 
transferred by Borrower without Lender's prior written 
consent. . . Lender may, at Lender's option, declare all the 
sums secured by this Deed of Trust to be immediately due 
and payable. Lender shall have waived such option to 
accelerate if, prior to the sale or transfer, Lender and the 
person to whom the Property is to be sold or transferred 
reach agreement in writing that the credit of such person 
is satisfactory to Lender and that the interest payable on 
the sums secured by this Deed of Trust shall be at such 
rate as Lender shall request. If Lender has waived the 
option to accelerate provided in this paragraph 17, and if 
Borrower's successor in interest has executed a written 
assumption agreement accepted in writing by Lender, Lender 
shall release borrower from all obligations under this Deed 
of Trust and the Note. 
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In short, two conditions for release are imposed, first that there is a prior written 
waiver of the right to accelerate, and second, that there tie a written assumption 
agreement accepted in writing by Gate City. The first condition imposed by that section 
is that the lender waive the option to accelerate. The trust deed clearly sets out the 
steps to be taken for a waiver to occur: 1) Lender and the person to whom the 
property is to be sold or transferred reach agreement in writing that the credit of such 
person is satisfactory to Lender; and 2) that the interest payable on the sums secured by 
the deed of trust shall be at such rate as Lender shall request. Therefore, in order to 
find a waiver there must be a written agreement entered into prior to the transfer which 
recites that the credit of the transferee is satisfactory to the Lender and establishes the 
agreed interest rate payable on the note as requested by the Lender. 
The Borrowers allege that the indemnity agreements satisfy these conditions. 
(Respondents1 Brief at p. 38.) The deficiencies in this argument are obvious. The 
indemnity agreements do not state that the credit of CC International is acceptable. 
Vaughn Cook admits that neither he nor CC International applied to have their credit 
approved (Second Affidavit of Vaughn Cook, R. 1005). He further states that he never 
executed a document which meets the requirements of Section 17. Id. 
As for the second requirement of a waiver, the indemnity agreements themselves 
make no mention of the interest rate nor any reference to any document which would 
set the interest rate or any other terms. The requirements of a prior written waiver 
preclude Respondents1 argument that the waiver and the assumption were accomplished 
by the same ambiguous language of the indemnity agreements. The Borrowers' assertion 
that the indemnity agreements meet the specific requirements set forth for a written 
waiver of the right to accelerate simply has no support in fact or logic. 
The Borrowers claim that these deficiencies are "irrelevant" because Gate City 
"demonstrated an intent to rely on the credit of Kilburn." (Respondents' Brief p. 41.) 
How this supports the argument that there was a prior written approval of the credit of 
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CC International is not clear. What is clear is that Gate City merely informed Cook that 
Kilburn would have to apply for assumption and that assumption was dependant upon 
approval of the assuming party's credit. (Deposition of Stan Jenkins, p. 25; Appendix 6 
Respondents' Brief.) 
The loan commitment made to Cook does nothing to bolster the Borrowers' 
argument that Gate City approved the credit of CC International. The loan commitment 
was based on the loan of funds to individual Fannie Mae qualified buyers. Id. No 
"intent", let alone written consent, was shown to indicate that Gate City was relying on 
the credit of any one but the individual Borrowers. Each Borrower went through the 
loan application, loan underwriting and loan approval process. This included submitting 
verifications of employment, deposit, income, credit, etc. Each Borrower was approved 
based on the information submitted. Each Borrower signed a promissory note and 
executed a trust deed. Nothing in the loan commitment can be construed to be prior 
written approval of the credit of CC International. 
B. There Was No Waiver By Forbearance. 
Recognizing the weakness of relying on the indemnity agreement as a "prior 
written waiver", Borrowers attempt to argue that waiver was made by Gate City's 
forbearance in exercising its right to accelerate. In support, Borrowers cite two cases. 
The first PLC Landscape Const, v. Piccadilly Fish "N" Chips, Inc., 28 Utah 2d 350, 502 
P.2d 562, 563 (Utah 1972), does not deal with waiver but merely states that a party may 
vary a written contract by a subsequent agreement so long as the subsequent agreement 
does not violate the rule against parol evidence. Id. This case has no application since 
prior approval is specifically required by the express language of paragraph 14. 
Furthermore, there is no assertion of any "subsequent agreement" which waived the 
specific requirements for release set forth in Paragraph 17 of the trust deeds. 
The second case cited by Borrowers, Cooper v. Deseret Federal Sav. & Loan 
Ass'n, 757 P.2d 483 (Utah App. 1988), also does not deal with waiver, but rather the 
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doctrine of laches. That case states that in the absence of a contractual provision 
setting the time to exercise the option, the option to accelerate must rx? exercised in a 
"reasonable time". The court stated that an election to accelerate a year or years in the 
future could be considered reasonable under ordinary circumstances. Id. at 485. What 
comprises a "reasonable time" depends upon the individual facts and circumstances of 
each case and is therefore a question of fact which precludes granting summary 
judgment. Id. Cooper holds that a party who does not exercise the right to accelerate 
in a "reasonable time" is simply barred by the doctrine of laches from exercising it. 
Cooper, 757 P.2d 485. 
There are significant differences in the doctrines of waiver and laches that make 
Cooper inapplicable to the instant case. Waiver is a conscious relinquishment of a known 
right. Martin v. Hickenlooper, 90 Utah 185, 61 P.2d 307 (1936). Whether or not there 
has been a waiver is a question of fact. Bowery Sav. Bank v. Jenkins, 30 Utah 2d 232, 
516 P.2d 178 (1973). Laches on the other hand is an equitable bar to the assertion of 
a right. Olansen v. Texaco Inc., 587 P.2d 976, 985 (Okla. 1978). In Cooper, equity 
demanded granting such a remedy. The borrower, in reliance on the lender's forbearance 
in exercising its right to accelerate, reacquired the property and brought the note 
current. Under such circumstances It would be inequitable to allow the lender to go 
back and accelerate the full amount of the debt based on the prior transfer. In the 
instant case, the question is not whether equity would prevent Gate City from exercising 
its right to accelerate, but whether Gate City voluntarily relinquished that right. Gate 
City specifically agreed in the trust deed that in order to ielinquish its rights, a prior 
written agreement was required. The doctrine of laches should not be confused with 
waiver especially where waiver is defined by contract and carries with it legal conse-
quences. 
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C. The Doctrine Of Ejusdem Generis Has No Application. 
The Borrowers misapply the doctrine of ejusdem generis in an attempt to support 
the argument that paragraph 11 of the trust deed does not apply to the right to 
accelerate. Paragraph 11 specifically states that forbearance by the lender in exercising 
its rights does not constitute a waiver of those rights. 
11. Forbearance by lender not a waiver. Any 
forbearance by lender in exercising any right or remedy 
hereunder, or otherwise, afforded by applicable law, shall 
not be a waiver of or preclude the exercise of any such 
right or remedy. 
Borrowers cite as supplemental authority Parrish v. Richards, 8 Utah 2d 419, 336 
P.2d 122 (1959). That case states the doctrine of ejusdem generis as follows: 
In those instances where a particular enumeration is 
followed by general terms, the latter will be understood as 
limited in their scope to matters and things of the same 
general kind or character as those specified in the par-
ticular enumeration, unless there is something to show a 
contrary intent. 
Parrish, 335 P.2d at 123 (emphasis added). In paragraph 11 of the trust deed, the 
general provision quoted above precedes a sentence containing more specific provisions. 
Where, as here, the general provisions precede the specific provisions, rather than vice 
versa, the doctrine cited to by the Borrowers simply has no application. 
There is no "prior written waiver" of the right to accelerate as specifically 
required by paragraph 17 of the trust deed. The doctrine of laches should not be 
confused with waiver especially here where waiver is defined by the contract and carries 
with it legal consequences. The terms of the trust deed specifically prohibit a waiver 
of the right to accelerate by forbearance. Given these facts, the trial court erred in 
determining that the first requirement of paragraph 17 had been met. In the absence of 
a waiver of the right to accelerate, the court need not reach the issue of whether the 
indemnity agreements meet the second requirement necessary to find a release under 
paragraph 17, i.e., a "written assumption agreement accepted in writing by Gate City." 
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II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS 
INTERPRETATION OF THE INDEMNITY AGREEMENTS. 
The trial court erred in holding that the indemnity agreements were, "as a matter 
of law, unambiguous assumption agreements. In reviewing the trial court's determina-
tion of a matter of law, this Court reviews for correctness and shows no deference to 
the trial court's findings. Allstate Enterprises, Inc. v. Hertford, 772 P.2d 466 (Utah App. 
1989). 
A document is ambiguous if it is capable of more than one reasonable interpreta-
tion. Kerr Land & Livestock, Inc. v. Giaus, 107 Idaho 757, 692 P.lid 1199 (Ct. App. 
1984). Defendants cite Ron Case Roofing and Asphalt Paving, Inc. v. Blomquist, 773 
P.2d 1382 (Utah 1989) in supporl of thnr argument that the language of the indemnity 
agreements is unambiguous. The language the court was called upon to interpret in Ron 
Case reads as follows: 
Panos, Bloomquist and Vesper, jointly and severally, agree 
to pay all indebtedness which is presently outstanding or in 
the future may arise which claims relate to the furnishing 
of labor, materials, equipment, tools, fuel, supplies and 
other items furnished to or incorporated into the Vesper 
Projects. 
Id. at 1385. That language clearly identifies the parties and the nature and extent of 
the obligation. After a single reading, it is possible to clearly understand the obligations 
created by the above language. That passage provides answers to all critical questions. 
Contrast that language with the convoluted language at issue in this case. 
Party of the First Part agrees upon demand to indemnify 
Party of the Second Part for any loss (including but not 
limited to amounts paid in discharge of the lien, expenses 
of investigation, preparation for litigation, judgment, court 
costs, and attorney's fees) it may sustain by reason of 
omitting to set out such lien(s) as an exception in the 
mortgage executed hereunder or by reason of enforcement 
of this agreement. The obligation of the Party of the first 
part in this agreement shall extend to the mortgage 
executed by, through, or for the Party of the First Part of 
assigns on the above premises. 
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The trial court found that the clear and unambiguous meaning of the above 
quoted language was that CC International agreed to take full, complete and sole 
responsibility not for payment of mechanic's liens but for the repayment of 1.8 million 
dollars in loans made to 21 different Borrowers.1 Appellant respectfully submits that the 
trial court's construction of the indemnity agreements is so far removed from their clear 
language that no one, layman, lawyer or judge, upon reading those documents without any 
further explanation would reach the same interpretation as the trial court. Not only is 
the meaning forced upon the indemnity agreements by the trial court not "clear and 
unambiguous", the trial court's interpretation is not even suggested by the language of 
the agreements themselves. The more reasonable interpretation of the indemnity 
agreements are to indemnify the lender, Gate City, for any mechanic's or materialmen's 
liens which are omitted from the mortgage. Had the trial court found that such was the 
meaning of the documents that conclusion would be understandable. At best, the above 
language is subject to more than one reasonable interpretation, therefore the language 
is not "clear and unambiguous". DeLancey v. DeLancey, 110 Idaho 63, 714 P.2d 32 
(1986). The trial court erred in so ruling and erred in granting summary judgment based 
on that ruling. 
III. EVEN IF THE LANGUAGE OF THE DOCUMENT WAS CLEAR 
AND UNAMBIGUOUS, SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS NOT APPROPRIATE 
WHERE THERE ARE QUESTIONS OF FACT REGARDING THE 
PARTIES1 INTENT IN ENTERING INTO THE AGREEMENT. 
A. Documentary Evidence Is Not Dispositive If The Intent And Purpose Underlying The 
Documents Are At Issue. 
It is strange that the parties claiming that the indemnity agreements are "clear 
and unambiguous" are not parties to the agreement. The parties to the indemnity 
agreements, CC International and Gate City, clearly expressed, through affidavits 
submitted to the trial court, that they did not understand or intend the indemnity 
*The entire amount of the transaction was 2.2 million dollars, however, two of the 
Borrowers did not join in the motion. 
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agreements to be construed as assumptions. (Second Affidavit of Vaughn Cook, f 8; 
Appendix E Appellant's Brief; Affidavit of Blaze Johnson; Record at 575, 829, 958.) 
The trial court erred in ignoring evidence of the parties' intent, even if the 
indemnity agreements seemed clear and unambiguous. W.M. Barnes Co. v. Sohio Natural 
Resources Co., 627 P.2d 56 (Utah 1981). (See, Appellant's Brief, Point III.) In the 
instant case, the central issue facing the trial court was the intent of the parties in 
executing the indemnity agreements. The affidavits of Vaughn Cook submitted to the 
trial court create questions of fact regarding the intent of CC International. The second 
affidavit of Vaughn Cook states that 
. . . neither I, nor my company, CC International, Inc., ever 
applied to Gate City Mortgage Company to have our credit 
approved in connection with assuming the subject mortgage 
loan obligations, nor did we execute a writing whereby 
Gate City Mortgage Company approved our credit as an 
assuming party or fixed the interest rate to be charged, nor 
did we ever execute a writing to assume such obligations 
or otherwise agree or consent thereto, nor did we intend 
or understand that the defendants would be released from 
liability thereby. 
(Second Affidavit of Vaughn Cook, H 8; Record at 1005; Appendix E Appellant's Brief.) 
The third affidavit of Vaughn Cook states: 
It is true that at the time I signed those indemnity 
agreements, I did not realize that those instruments, by 
themselves, manifested an agreement by CC International 
to assume the obligations of the mortgage loans. 
(Third Affidavit of Vaughn Cook, H 15; Appendix No. 1 Respondents1 Brief.) A party's 
intent must be determined as of the time of the transaction. Hefley Ranch, Inc. v. 
Stewart, 764 P.2d 415 (Colo. App. 1988). The statement In Cook's third affidavit that 
he would have "intended to assume . . . if only for a interim period" was not a statement 
of his intent at the ti me the transaction was entered into. He clearly stated that at the 
time that the transaction was entered into, he did not .have the understanding that he 
was assuming the Borrowers' liability. (Third Affidavit of Vaughn Cook, f 16.) Cook 
admits that he never applied for assumption of the loans and never signed any documents 
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to effect an assumption. The statement in Cook's third affidavit stating in retrospect 
what he "would have done" demonstrates not only that he did not have the intention of 
assuming the loans when signing the documents but also demonstrates that the indemnity 
agreements were so ambiguous that he did not understand them to have had that effect. 
If the tables were turned and Gate City was suing Cook claiming that he assumed 1.8 
million dollars in loans by signing the indemnity agreements, clearly his affidavit would 
raise a question of fact regarding his intent which would preclude summary judgment 
against him. The result should be consistent where, as here, Gate City raised the 
question of fact regarding his intent in entering into the indemnity agreements. 
B. Respondent's Argument That All Parties Knew That Assumptions Were Intended Is 
Misplaced. 
Respondents1 argument that they anticipated an assumption cuts against their 
position. It is clear from the facts presented to the trial court that they understood 
that Kilburn Vacation Home Share not CC International was to make application to 
assume the loans. The Borrowers all expected Kilburn to assume the loans and executed 
assumption agreements for it to do so. (Appendix E Appellant's Brief; see also, Point 
IV.B., page 29 Appellant's Brief.) Cook stated that Kilburn was to assume the loans. 
(Deposition of Vaughn Cook, p. 300; Record at 1087.) Jenkins was told that Kilburn was 
going to apply for assumption. (Deposition of Stan Jenkins at p. 24; Appendix 6 
Respondents' Brief.) Jim Clark, on behalf of Kilburn Vacation Home Share, stated that 
Kilburn would attempt to assume the loans. (Affidavit of Jim Clark, H 3; Appendix No. 
5 Respondents' Brief.) The undisputed fact is that despite any expectations, promises or 
commitments to the contrary, Kilburn never assumed the loans. (Respondents' Brief at 
32.) The court did not find that Kilburn assumed the loans, therefore, Respondents' 
"understanding" of how the loans were to be assumed is contrary to the position now 
taken by Respondents that CC International assumed the loans. 
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C. The Affidavit Of Blaze Johnson Contains Competent Evidence. 
The affidavit of Blaze Johnson2 is more than "unsubstantiated opinion" as asserted 
by Respondents. In Williams v. Melby, 699 P.2d 723 (Utah 1985), cited by the respon-
dents, the court reversed summary judgment and found that an affidavit of plaintiff's 
architect created issues of material fact which precluded summary judgment. The court 
so found despite the fact that the architect did not design the house in question, but 
merely made observations and offered opinions based on those observations. The 
affidavit of Mr. Johnson established that to accomplish an assumption Gate City would 
use proper forms and follow the requirements of its trust deed. Mr. Johnson has personal 
knowledge of those facts which were material to the determination of the question 
before the court. Based on those facts, Mr. Johnson makes comparison of the transaction 
in question with the accepted procedures and practices of Gate City. Adequate 
foundation is laid for each of the facts and observations drawn. Therefore, the affidavit 
is competent evidence and creates a question of fact regarding the meaning of Gate 
City's forms and its intent in executing the indemnity agreements in question. 
D. Questions Of Fact Are Raised By The Other Relevant Documents. 
In section IV of their brief, the Borrowers admit that the uniform real estate 
contracts executed by Vaughn Cook state that the properties were taken "subject to" the 
mortgage. Those real estate contracts were to be "fully paid" when a complete 
assumption of Respondents' liability was made. (Deposition of Vaughn Cook, p. 300; 
Record at 1037.) Respondents at page 33 of their brief assert that the indemnity 
agreements "fulfill this contractual obligation of CC International to defendants." This 
conclusion cannot be true for several reasons. First, the indemnity agreements were 
entered prior to the real estate contracts and therefore could not be in satisfaction of 
the conditions stated therein. Second, Cook did not do any act necessary to satisfy the 
2A copy of the affidavit is attached hereto as Appendix "A". 
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requirements of a release under paragraph 17 of the trust deed. (Second Affidavit of 
Vaughn Cook, H 8.) Third, the contracts were not treated as satisfied but remained in 
escrow at Alta Title. (Deposition of Vaughn Cook, p. 300; Record at 1087.) Fourth, any 
assumption by Cook would have at most been a simple or "interim assumption". (Third 
Affidavit of Vaughn Cook, H 15.) Fifth, Kilburn was to apply for and obtain a complete 
formal assumption and release. (Affidavit of Jim Clark, H 3; Record at 1432.) 
The intent of the parties to the transactions is placed squarely at issue in this 
case. Their conduct and the other relevant documents clearly create questions of fact 
regarding their intent. Therefore, even if the documents were deemed "unambiguous", 
the questions of fact surrounding the intent of Gate City and CC International in 
entering into the indemnity agreements preclude summary judgment as a matter of law. 
IV. APPELLANT DOES NOT HAVE THE BURDEN 
OF CONVINCING THE COURT OF ANY ALTERNATIVE 
INTERPRETATION OF THE INDEMNITY AGREEMENTS. 
At page 18 of their Brief, Borrowers inaccurately state that Appellant had not 
discussed the language in the beginning of each indemnity agreement which states that 
CC International had obtained a mortgage. Appellant refers the Court to pages 16 and 
17 of its Brief which points out that this language created a latent ambiguity in the 
document since it is undisputed that no mortgage loans were made to CC International. 
The Borrowers would have the Court draw an inference from this obviously 
inaccurate language to support their construction of the indemnity agreements. However, 
on viewing a motion for summary judgment, the court must view all facts and all 
inferences drawn from those facts in the light most favorable to the party resisting the 
motion. Allstate Enterprises, Inc. v. Heriford, 772 P.2d 466 (Utah App. 1989). Viewing 
the inaccurate language in the indemnity agreements in the light most favorable to Gate 
City, the language creates ambiguity in the documents which would preclude summary 
judgment. See, Frisbee v. K&K Construction Co., 676 P.2d 387, 390 (Utah 1980). 
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The "questions" posed by Borrowers on pages 19 and 20 of their brief are typical 
of the genuine issues of material fact which preclude summary judgment. Respondents 
seem to suggest that Appellant must prove some alternative interpretation of the 
indemnity agreements in order to prevail. In order to avoid summary judgment, Appellant 
need only demonstrate that an ambiguity exists. Kerr Land and Livestock v. Glaus, 692 
P.2d 1199 (Idaho Ct. App. 1984). 
There are numerous "reasonable explanations" which address the questions listed 
by Borrowers at pages 19 and 20 of their brief. It is not Appellant's burden in avoiding 
summary judgment to prove any of the "reasonable explanations" of the language of the 
indemnity agreements. It was and is Borrowers' burden to show there is only one "clear 
and unambiguous" interpretation of the indemnity agreements and to establish that there 
were no questions of fact regarding that interpretation. 
The question posed by the Borrowers at pages 19 and 20 of their Brief can be 
easily answered consistent with other "reasonable interpretations" of the indemnity 
agreements. 
1. CC International signed the indemnity agreements at Gate City's 
request. (Third Affidavit of Vaughn Cook, fl 12 R. 1052.) It was willing to 
accommodate Gate City's desire to be protected from mechanic's liens to protect 
its own interest in making sure this deal went through. If the loans were not 
made Vaughn Cook, principal of CC International, stood to lose a great deal of 
money. 
2. CC International was not the obligor on the notes and may have been 
described as having "obtained" a mortgage from Gate City in a misguided attempt 
to show consideration for its promise to indemnify against mechanic's liens. This 
is consistent with the language used later in the document which states the 
mortgages were executed "by, for or on behalf of CC International." This 
language reflects not that CC International was liable on the loans, but that CC 
13 
International has an interest in the transaction which could serve as considera-
tion for its promise to indemnify. 
3. Either party, Gate City or CC International may have wished to omit 
the liens from the recorded security interest to make the loans and the 
properties easier to transfer. 
4. CC International was willing to indemnify against materialmen's liens 
because as the builder it was already obligated to pay those who provided 
material and labor. It neither increased its obligation or risk by agreeing to 
indemnity Gate City against such liens. It also anticipated immediate income 
from the sale of the homes which would allow it to pay the material providers 
and release any liens. 
5. CC International stood to "benefit in the conduct of its business" by 
selling the homes to the Borrowers and then repurchasing the homes, with 
permanent financing in place and reselling them to Kilburn Vacation Home Share. 
6. The language that CC International's obligation to indemnify extends 
to this mortgage should at best be interpreted as making it a surety not a 
principal obligor. 
7. The language that the mortgages were executed by, for or on behalf 
of CC International, while not technically correct, accurately reflects Cook's 
view of the transaction since each of the Borrowers entered into the transaction 
on Cook's inducement and request. 
While Appellant does not bear the burden of proving any "reasonable interpreta-
tion" of the indemnity agreement, the fact that the questions posed by Borrowers can be 
answered based on Appellant's view of the facts clearly shows that the indemnity 
agreements are subject to reasonable interpretations which conflict with the trial court's 
reading of the indemnity agreements. Therefore, the documents are ambiguous and 
14 
summary judgment is inappropriate as a matter of law. W.M. Barnes v. Sohio Natural 
Resources Co., 627 P.2d 56 (Utah 1981). 
V. RESPONDENTS BEAR THE BURDEN OF PROOF ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
Respondents argue in Section VI of their brief that Gate City had the obligation 
to come forward with a submission to place in issue the fact that the indemnity 
agreements were not submitted for each of the moving parties. In support they cite 
Schaer v. State of Utah, 657 P.2d 1337 (Utah 1983). That case states "where the 
moving party's evidentiary material is itself sufficient, and the opposing party fails to 
offer any evidentiary matters when it is in a position to do so. . . ." In the instant case, 
the moving party's evidentiary material is not sufficient. Borrowers claim that the 
indemnity agreement is a complete assumption and claimed that all movants are released 
even though they cannot produce the critical documents for two of the transactions. 
On a motion for summary judgment, the moving parties have the burden of establishing 
the facts which entitle them to relief. See, FMA Acceptance Co. v. Leatherby Ins. Co., 
594 P.2d 1332 (Utah 1979). Here, Borrowers have failed to meet that burden. Gate City 
is not in a position to submit an affidavit as to the non-existence of a fact. Appellant 
simply argued to the trial court as it does here that appellant does not have those 
documents in its files. The non-existence of the documents in the files of Gate City 
where they would normally be found creates a reasonable inference that the documents 
do not exist. It is incumbent upon the Borrowers as moving parties to produce such 
documents. Borrowers simply could not produce the documents. The affidavit of Vaughn 
Cook may create an inference that the documents exist, however, to make a determina-
tion between two conflicting inferences is not proper on a motion for summary judgment. 
See, Jackson v. Dabney, 645 P.2d 613 (Utah 1982). 
15 
CONCLUSION 
In order to rule as it did, the trial court had to determine that the requirements 
of paragraph 17 of the trust deed had been met. The first requirement, a written waiver 
of the right to accelerate, has never been met. Unless this Court finds that this 
condition is met, it need not determine whether the trial court was correct in ruling that 
the indemnity agreements constituted clear and unambiguous agreements by CC Interna-
tional to assume complete and full responsibility for payment of promissory notes signed 
by the Borrowers. 
With regard to this second requirement, the language of the indemnity agreement 
contain patent and latent ambiguities. The intent of the parties in signing the indemnity 
agreements was clearly placed at issue. The conflicting affidavits of the parties and the 
other relevant documents submitted to the trial court all create questions of fact 
regarding Gate City and CC International's intent in entering into the indemnity 
agreements. These questions of fact may not be determined on a motion for summary 
judgment, therefore the judgment of the trial court must be reversed. 
Respectfully submitted this 26th day of February, 1990. 
CAMPBELL MAACK & SESSIONS 
K
—CtARK W. SESSIONS V ' _ 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant 
^ v . - -
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I hereby certify on the 26th day of February, 1990, I caused to be hand 
delivered four true and correct copies of the foregoing Reply Brief of Appellant to the 
following: 
Earl J. Peck, Esq. 
John K. Mangum, Esq. 
Douglas K. Pehrson, Esq. 
Jay R. Mohlman, Esq. 
NIELSEN & SENIOR 
Attorneys for Defendants-Respondents 
1100 Beneficial Life Tower 
36 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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CLARK W. SESSIONS (2914) 
ROY B. MOORE (2308) 
KEVIN EGAN ANDERSON (099) 
SESSIONS & MOORE 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
400 First Federal Plaza 
505 East 200 South 
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Telephone: (801) 359-4100 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SUMMIT COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
GATE CITY FEDERAL SAVINGS 
AND LOAN ASSOCIATION, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
EDWARD A. DALTON, JR., JOHN C. 
FORRESTER, JR., MICHAEL C. 
JOHNSEN, and DANIEL W. MARCUM, 
et al., 
Defendants. 
EDWARD A. DALTON, JR., JOHN C. 
FORRESTER, JR., MICHAEL C. 
JOHNSEN, and DANIEL W. MARCUM, 
et al., 
Counterclaimants, 
v. 
GATE CITY FEDERAL SAVINGS AND 
LOAN ASSOCIATION, 
AFFIDAVIT OF 
BLAISE P. JOHNSON 
Consolidated Case No. 
(8075) 
(8076) 
(8077) 
(8078) 
(8079) 
(8080) 
(8081) 
(8082) 
(8119) 
(8120) 
8074 
Counterclaim Defendant. 
STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA) 
: SS. 
COUNTY OF CASS ) 
I, Blaise P. Johnson, being first duly sworn state as 
follows: 
1. I am an officer of Gate City Mortgage Company. 
2. The Indemnity Agreement form attached is a standard, 
pre-printed form, used by Gate City Mortgage Company to obtain 
indemnification on mechanics and/or materialmens liens. 
3. As of the date of each of the Indemnity Agreements 
involving the subject Jeremy Ranch properties, no mortgage loans 
had been made to C.C. International or Vaughn Cook by Gate City 
Mortgage Company. 
4. The Indemnity Agreements covering the subject Jeremy 
Ranch properties do not reflect that C.C. International or Vaughn 
Cook had, or was thereby, assuming the obligation on the Jeremy 
Ranch mortgage loans made to the Defendants in the 
above-captioned matter, secured by the subject Jeremy Ranch 
property. 
5. As of the date of the execution of each of the Indemni-
ty Agreements covering the subject Jeremy Ranch properties, 
neither C.C. International nor Vaughn Cook had^ae* applied for 
assumption of the subject Jeremy Ranch mortgage loans. 
6. Standard forms are used to accomplish an assumption. 
These forms clearly state whether or not the original borrower is 
released from liability on the loan. (see Exhibit "B" attached). 
7. The Indemnity Agreement form is not used to evidence an 
assumption. It is used simply to insure that the indemnitor, 
here C.C. International, would indemnify Gate City for mechanics 
or materialmens liens on the properties. 
DATED 3rd day of February, 1989. 
BLAISE P. JOHNSON \J 
1989 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 3rd day of February, 
-. \ • 
My Commission Expi res 
XNOTARY PUBLIC 
R e s i d i n g a t ; West Fargo, North Dakota 
SANDRA H. BERGOUISi 
Hotary Public, STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA 
My Commission Expires juwe 2 m 
•\ INDEMNITY AGREEMENT 
THIS AGREEMENT, made and entered into ti,k 30th
 d.fy ot' -feeceffifcfer 
3 • i • •::?.• '-.ill '•' •»• -A 
l"\ 
81 i 
between . 
-C. C. I n t c r o a t i o n a J -
'i9JLL<by and-
'^hereinafter referred to an Party of the 
First Part and Gate Ci ty Mortqaqe Company,' h e r e i n a f t e r referred;"to *ac J .Party ;bf the •' 
Second Part . ,' ,. ; '•;. • ••;'•}. £'
 4
:
 •' ' • ' ; • •; ' 
•"'•'•• ' >' • '.'•• WITNESSETH- .-.'J. ? , ;; > "§ )':Xy" '• ;:. . 
f ) • . ' ', • ; • • - • ••'•'-
WHEREAS, Party of the First; Part has obtained from the Party'gfljtho Second Part 
.-) f i r s t mortgage loan for the principal-balance'of $200,000.00 on the following 
described property:; •[ . . ^ .">••
 : . > . ; • • . * . ) .. j . ?.; 
•'. • f. • V : >'-. ' ;'v • '' .'*...: •' .-j ' -I • 
All of Lot 48, The Jeremy Ranch"'Plat No.'.l," according to the.official plat 
thereof, recorded in the. office of the Summit Qounty .Recorder. *:; . X'' ' 
Subject to and together with a right of way for the purpose of ingress and 
egress over those roadways as designated on the official pla£ of Jeremy Ranch 
Plat No.' 1, as recorded in-the Summit County Recorders office, as Entry No. 
157211/ ••.'•'. ...,••• ; •; >v . ' \ "> -% 
Situate in Summit County, State of Utah. 
^ > . . : . . * ' • • < - . • ' * • . • * • ! « - • *- • • ' . . . f , • • ? 
•: *. • • .••;• • • • • : . > " . '••. • • *-, ' • ? • • , - I- • »• \ • r " • " Y ' * • ' ! • 
• ' ' £ •-•••;> * •••'-• r ? - & ' -' ' 3- : ' •T: " • ; ) . . . ( ~<\ 
and such property is now subject to mechanic*' and/or .materialmen's liens insofar a.s the-time for filing * 
the same is concerned and it is the desire of the Party of the First Part that such mortgage shiill bci 
executed without shpwinq therein an exception for such possible l i e n s , and the"P;irty of 
the Second Part i s hot agreeable thereto unless the Party of the r'ir:;t Part shall 
guarantee the.discharge of such l i e n s . •:•
 : • . 
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the premises and the additional liability Party of the 
Second Part will sustairfby reason of omitting to state, as an exception in such mortqnqe the i n t e r e s t o 
mechanics' and/or materialmen's lien holders (or possible lien holders), and in consideration of the benefit 
of the Party of the First Part in trie conduct .of its business by reason thereof, Party of the First Part 
guarantees and agrees as follows: • ./;,".. •' V)
 : V - fc ' '5 <; 
" ' • • • • . • • '• • ' • i * . \ 
That if the Party of the Second Part shall omit from such mortgage? an e x c e p t i o n c o n c e r n i n g c 
more of.such liens, fil^d or unfiled,,and one or more such mechanics' and/or materialmen's liens, is. lias 
been or may thereafter^ be filed or secured, on'the insured pre misjK effective or relating back to a date 
prior to the date of theipolicy.'then, upon written demand of the Party of the Second Part..the Party of the 
First Part agrees to promptly secure, the discharge of ail such liens.' •;.; ' 
. - ' ''•• . ' « 
In the event Party of the First Part fails to promptly discharge all such liens, then Party of the 
Second Part, may pay, compromise, settle or discharge such liens and recover from the Party of the First 
Part such amounts so paid. *: . * .: 
Party of the First Part agrees upon demand to indemnify Party of the Second Part for any 'J^S 
(inducing but not limircd to amounts paid in discharge of the lien,expenses of investigation, preparation 
for litigation, judgment, court costs,, and attorney's fees) it may sustain by reason of omitting to set out 
such lien (s) as;an exception in the mortgage executed hereunder or by!reason of enforcement: 
af t h i s agreement. -.The ob l iga t ion of the Party of tho Firs t Part in this'.agreement
 : 
shal l extend to thermortgage executed by, through, or for the Party of trie First Part 
of assigns on the above premises. .v-'.7?' ' ' V | - . . ••* ."j. :$''*''*•* 
. IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have hereunto'set their hands-arid seds th«'day ;\nd 
year first above written.;.v »;• ^; -r. • <' . 
.Hnte C i t y Morti 
, Party ufih< 
IMTERNATION/\L 
,e f-'ifsl l"art 
•; . ;.St3nley ^Tj Party of the First Part 
. . . 4 . , s . ** 
*t) v : ^ 
s 1 
V3: 
U EXHIBIT 
11
 A 
Gate City Mortgage Co. 
ASSUMPTION AGREEMENT 
THIS AGREEMENT made on the date hereinafter set forth opposite the signatures of Vendor 
and Purchaser, by and between: Donald Lewis Smith, a married man and Jedd P. Jones, 
?...™??S.).?f*..™?.~ hereinafter called Vendors, 
a n ( j !< jj.burri Vac a t .i onI..HOITO_ S.hare, .J.nc.. _ _ hereinafter called 
„
 e . , , „ 8*?5 W~st S i l v e r Spur Doad 
Purchasers, of property located at - — 
WHEREAS .?.?+®..f?.I.t.Y ^rlgage..CO;_ _
 i s t h e o w n e r a n d 
holder of a certain note dated ...1.?~9.?~§J. executed and delivered by Vendors or cheir pred-
ecessors in interest to . ...Gate City...Mortgage..Ccu.. 
in tho princip.il amount of $ ?.9P.^ 9.P..\9.Q ...secured by a mortgage executed and delivered by 
Vendors or thetr predecessors in interest and recorded in Book M2Q.9.... of at Page 29-33 
in the ...Summit. .. County Recorder's office, State of -Utah— —, 
as Document No. .!.?.7.7.?.l 
WHEREAS, Vendors represent that all regular required monthly installment payments here-
tofore due and'owing under the note and mortgage have been paid and that all other obligations 
to be performed prior to the date hereof under the terms of the note and mortgage have been 
performed, and that the unpaid balance of the loan as of is % 
with interest paid to — • 
WHEREAS. Purchasers have purchased or are now purchasing from Vendors the property 
covered by said Mortgage: 
NOW, THEREFORE, the said parties, in consideration of '.he premises and of their mutual 
promises as herein set forth, do agree as follows: 
Purchasers assume and agree to pay said note as therein provided, and further to assume ail 
the obligations of said mortgage as therein provided, and to perform in accordance with the cov-
enants and conditions thereof. 
It is understood that Mortgagee does not release Vendor or Vendors from further liability 
under or on account of the said note and mortgage. 
Vendors hereby transfer to Purchasers, subject to the conditions of the mortgage pertaining 
to same, ail their right, title and interest in the policy of hazard insurance and in the funds on 
deposit in escrow as payment for taxes and hazard insurance premium, and mortgage insurance 
premium, in connection with said mortgage. 
The word "note" as used herein shall be construed to mean note, bond or other instrument 
evidencing the indebtedness herein referred to. The word "mortgage" as used herein shall be con-
strued to mean mortgage, deed of trust, or other instrument securing the indebtedness herein re-
ferred to. The word "Mortgagor" shall include Trustor, and word "Mortgagee' shall include Bene-
ficiary under a deed of trust. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, this instrument has been executed by the parties hereto on the 
dates set forth opposite their names. .-• 
Dated _ <• - -C^T?!< ' ^ ^ ^ f e ? - ? - ^ ^ ? ! . . 
Donald Lewis Smith ^tndor 
P. Jones ' Ve Jedd <»nes/ ndor 
Dated 
Purchaser 
Purchaser 
(over) 
r . 9 i n 3 
